



16 March 2008

US Autos and Auto Parts

Paradigm Shift for the Global Auto Industry

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We remain concerned about the ramifications of higher oil prices.

The shift from traditional light trucks to crossover vehicles and cars has been ongoing since 2005, but we see potential for this shift to accelerate, significantly reducing profitability for U.S. Automakers. Looking purely at the mix impact, we estimate that a reduction in demand for large pickup trucks and large SUV's to 1990 levels would reduce GM's long term profitability by \$4.5 bn, (\$8.00 EPS). A similar analysis implies a reduction of \$2.2 bn (\$1.50 EPS) for Ford.

Technology change represents a new risk and opportunity.

Investors should be aware that motor vehicle technology has the potential to change more significantly over the next 5 years than it has in the past 100 years. Technological change adds another level of uncertainty for investors in the auto industry. Companies that embrace the winning technology have the potential for disproportionate market share gains. Those that do not could be left behind. The potential for electric vehicles (EV's) could be highly disruptive to the used car market. Particularly in markets such as Europe, where the operating cost differential between emerging electric vehicles (EV's) and internal combustion cars is projected to be high.

Environmental mandates may not cause inflationary vehicle pricing.

We've been concerned that complying with new CAFÉ and CO2 regulations in North America and Europe would place tremendous burdens on automakers and consumers, leading to slower growth and lower profitability. GM's 10K suggests that the new CAFÉ standards could cost the industry \$100 bn per year, or \$5000 per vehicle. While there is still considerable uncertainty on how this will play out, and the R&D burden is still significant, we met with a proponent of electric vehicles whose business model suggests that future vehicles that comply with new regs may not be more expensive to buy or operate.

We see potential for a paradigm shift in the way vehicles are owned and fueled

We recently met with Better PLC, a proponent of EV's globally. Looking at Better PLC's model, we conclude that a pure EV should not be more expensive than a gasoline/diesel vehicle. And in most countries, operating costs could be much lower. The paradigm shift in our thinking about EV's is that we believe businesses such as Better PLC will emerge that will own the batteries, and charge for "miles". Including electricity and depreciation on the battery, the cost of a mile should be no more than \$0.07. This compares with \$0.24 per mile for \$6.00/gal gasoline in Europe and \$0.15-\$0.20 for \$3.00-\$4.00 gasoline in the U.S.

Sector Valuation and Risks

We utilize an EV/EBITDA valuation methodology for our companies with extensive liabilities and P/E valuation methodology for companies that generate considerable free cash flow and exhibit an ability to consistently grow earnings. The principal sector risk is significantly higher or lower-than-expected North American auto demand.

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
Industry Analysis

Companies featured	
General Motors (GM.N),USD19.22	Hold
Autoliv (ALV.N),USD50.32	Buy
American Axle & Manufacturing (AXL.N),USD21.37	Buy
BorgWarner (BWA.N),USD41.67	Hold
Ford Motor (F.N),USD5.29	Buy
Johnson Controls (JCI.N),USD32.64	Hold
Lear Corporation (LEA.N),USD25.11	Hold
Magna International (MGA.N),USD70.93	Hold
TRW Automotive (TRW.N),USD23.73	Buy
Visteon (VC.N),USD3.44	Hold

With unemployment rising, consumer confidence plummeting, U.S. consumer wealth falling, and credit availability becoming more constrained, reasons to be concerned about the prospects for the Global Auto Industry are in abundance. But our greatest concern over the intermediate to longer term is oil. The world is currently consuming 88 million barrels per day. Demand is expected to increase by at least 1.5 MM barrels per day per year, and many industry experts believe that global capacity will peak at approximately 100 MM barrels per day (see our note published today on our trip to China, where 6 MM of the 26 MM light vehicles in operation were sold last year, and the SAAR is increasing by more than 1 MM units per year). With these types of drivers and very little evidence of demand destruction from high oil prices, we're not willing to bet on a sharp decline from \$110 oil. We remain concerned about the ramifications of these changes for the Global Automakers.

The shift from traditional light trucks to crossover vehicles and cars has been an ongoing phenomenon since 2005, but we see potential for this shift to accelerate, significantly reducing profitability and capacity utilization for the U.S. Automakers (see our April 15, 2005 report entitled "End of an Era"). We would note that 2007 segment market share for full-sized pickups was 13.4%. Peak market share for large pickups was 14.8% in 2004; but they were only 8.6% of the market in 1990, and 7.3% in 1986. The full sized SUV segment has already declined to 4.2% of the market from its peak of 6.2% in 2003. But prior to 1995, the segment never accounted for more than 1.5% of US demand (it was 1.2% of the market in 1990). Based on our estimates for the differential in incremental margin for the U.S. automakers (for GM we estimate it's \$8,000 for a large pickup, \$12,000 for a large SUV, \$2,500 for a small SUV, \$5,000 for a mid car, \$2,500 for a small car), we are concerned that our intermediate term assumptions may not be sufficiently negative. We've been assuming a 160 basis point decline in traditional truck segment market share through 2010. In a bear case scenario, we assume that large SUV's and pickups segment market share declines to 1990 levels (by 300 bps and 500 bps for large SUV's and pickups, respectively). Such a decline would reduce long term profitability by \$4.5bn for GM and \$2.2bn for Ford. There would also be significant negative implications for several U.S. suppliers including American Axle, Lear, Magna and Dana.

Figure 1: US Car vs Truck Sales (as of year end 2007)



Source: Deutsche Bank, Wards

In considering the long term implications of higher oil prices and tightening regulations, we've begun to also consider the potential for even more radical changes, including changes to the way vehicles are owned and fueled. One proponent of this shift is a company called Better PLC. We met with CEO of Better PLC at the company's Palo Alto HQ. Our conclusion: This company's concept could cause massive disruption to the auto industry as it exists today.

Many companies are working on different concepts to reduce dependence on oil from the transportation sector. Many of them are focused on changing conventional internal combustion engines (i.e. turbocharged direct injected gasoline and diesel engines), adding electric powertrains to conventional gasoline engines (i.e. the Hybrid Prius, Camry, Civic, Accord, Aura, Malibu, Escape), or adding gasoline engines to extend the range of a conventional electric vehicles (i.e. GM's Volt plug-in vehicle concept). Better PLC is focused on the infrastructure for purely electric vehicles, which have the potential to eliminate the gasoline engine altogether. Importantly, these vehicles would be cheaper vs. today's gasoline vehicles, and more reliable.

Success for this concept will involve distribution of Lithium Ion batteries, establishing networks of battery exchange stations (like gas stations, in which batteries can be swapped for fully charged ones), and distributing recharging panels that will allow electric vehicles to be charged at home, in parking lots/garages, etc. The current state of the art for lithium ion batteries have the capacity to propel a vehicle in excess of 100 miles, which would suffice for 95% of daily driving, and enable 95% of vehicle charging to be done at home. Battery exchange stations will facilitate longer distance driving.

Better PLC has recently announced an agreement with Israel to facilitate the deployment of EV's and Better PLC's infrastructure in that country in a tax advantaged manner such that their vehicles will cost roughly ½ that of conventionally taxed vehicles. 30 more countries and many more cities are considering measures to promote CO2 reduction (later this year London will begin charging £25 per day to drivers of high CO2 emitting vehicles). We believe that entities in 5-10 countries are in the pipeline to announce deals with Better PLC over the course of this year. Renault and Nissan have already announced plans to produce EV's that will use Better PLC's infrastructure, and we expect others. Frankly, we are not aware of any reason why they would not sign up for this, as the automakers do not need to commit capital for infrastructure or for batteries under Better PLC's business model.

We think companies such as Better PLC have the potential to drive significant change in the Global Auto Industry. This company wants to retain ownership the electrification infrastructure—the battery exchange stations, recharging panels, and even the batteries. The buyer of an electric vehicle would buy the car without the battery—typically for less than a new car would cost today—and buy miles from Better PLC, at a cost that is lower than the cost of buying gasoline in most countries (there are a few Mideast countries where gasoline costs \$0.15 a gallon). Those miles would be supplied via fully charged batteries at Better PLC exchange centers, and they would be available by hooking up to the recharging panels at home. Consumers can pay by the mile, buy a fixed number of miles per month (i.e. 1000 miles), or they could purchase unlimited miles—the concept is similar to that of cellular service providers. In fact, in some countries Better PLC believes they can offer a package that includes the vehicle along with a long term mileage contract (i.e. Buy 18,000 miles per year for \$550 per month, and get a new car as part of the deal). The concept is similar to buying minutes and getting a free phone from a cellular service provider. Our preliminary estimates suggest that this business model would be particularly compelling from a consumer's perspective in markets with higher gas prices (i.e. \$4+), where internal combustion vehicles are highly taxed at the state level, or in cities that are attempting to tax higher CO2 emitting vehicles. With gasoline at \$6 per gallon in Europe, the cost of driving 12,000-18,000 miles is approximately \$2880-\$4320 per year using a 25 MPG car. The

equivalent cost of electricity for 12,000-18,000 miles of driving would be between \$240-\$360 for the electricity alone (\$900-\$1350 including depreciation on the battery). The savings are so large, that we believe the introduction of this concept could have implications for residual values of conventional internal combustion vehicles, given their higher operating costs.

What we find unique about this model, as opposed to others we've seen, such as the Volt extended range EV, or the Prius Hybrid, is that the system appears to be financially compelling even in the U.S., where fuel costs are relatively low. Consumers in the U.S today typically pay between \$0.15 and \$0.20 a mile for fuel, assuming \$3.00-\$4.00 gas and 20 miles per gallon.

Lithium Ion batteries are expected to cost under \$500/kWh. A typical car requires 22 kWh to achieve a 100 mile range, which implies roughly \$10,000-\$11,000 for a typical battery pack (Note that most drivers in Europe drive less than 30 miles per day, and would consume only 6.6 KWH per day. Factoring in transmission losses, the utility would need 8kWh to replenish this. Over 24 hours, the consumption is equivalent to slightly over 300W per vehicle, which is like having 5 light bulbs on in a typical house every day). Manufacturers of these packs suggest that the batteries will have a life cycle of 7,000 charges. Better PLC assumes 2,000 charges, which would provide 200,000 miles of use. Amortizing the cost of the battery over 200,000 miles implies \$0.05-\$0.055 of depreciation cost per mile (note that battery manufacturers such as A123 Systems believe that the life expectancy of these batteries could be 2x-3x this assumption).

1 kWh is sufficient to drive 5 miles. Assuming electricity costs of \$0.10 per kWh, each mile will cost approximately \$0.02. Adding together the depreciation on the battery and the cost of electricity implies a cost of \$0.07 per mile; less than half the \$0.15-\$0.20 cost of gasoline at \$3.00-\$4.00 per gallon in the U.S. (at 20 MPG) and at least \$0.24 per mile in Europe (at 25 MPG).

Figure 2: Full-size Pickup Sensitivity

Fullsize Pickup					
Change in Segment Share	-100bps	-200bps	-300bps	-400bps	-500bps
Segment Share	12.4%	11.4%	10.4%	9.4%	8.4%
Ford					
Ford Share	29.8%	29.8%	29.8%	29.8%	29.8%
Lost Units	(50,733)	(101,467)	(152,200)	(202,933)	(253,667)
Contribution Per Unit	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
Pre-tax Impact (\$MM)	-507	-1015	-1522	-2029	-2537
EPS Impact	\$ (0.24)	\$ (0.47)	\$ (0.71)	\$ (0.94)	\$ (1.18)
Offset by growth in other segments					
Ford Total Share	15.5%	15.5%	15.5%	15.5%	15.5%
Change in Units	26,434	52,868	79,301	105,735	132,169
Contribution Per Unit	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Pre-tax Impact	159	317	476	634	793
EPS Impact	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.15	\$ 0.22	\$ 0.30	\$ 0.37
Ford Net Pre-tax Impact	(349)	(697)	(1,046)	(1,395)	(1,744)
Ford Net EPS Impact	\$ (0.16)	\$ (0.32)	\$ (0.49)	\$ (0.65)	\$ (0.81)
General Motors					
GM Share	41.4%	41.4%	41.4%	41.4%	41.4%
Lost Units	(70,296)	(140,593)	(210,889)	(281,186)	(351,482)
Contribution Per Unit	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000
Pre-tax Impact	-562	-1125	-1687	-2249	-2812
EPS Impact	\$ (0.99)	\$ (1.98)	\$ (2.97)	\$ (3.95)	\$ (4.94)
Offset by growth in other segments					
GM Share	23.8%	23.8%	23.8%	23.8%	23.8%
Units Gained	40,410	80,821	121,231	161,642	202,052
Contribution Per Unit	6000	6000	6000	6000	6000
Pre-tax Impact	242.46	484.93	727.39	969.85	1,212.31
EPS Impact	\$ 0.43	\$ 0.85	\$ 1.28	\$ 1.70	\$ 2.13
GM Net Pre-tax Impact	(320)	(640)	(960)	(1,280)	(1,600)
GM Net EPS Impact	\$ (0.56)	\$ (1.12)	\$ (1.69)	\$ (2.25)	\$ (2.81)

Source Deutsche Bank, Wards, Company reports

Figure 3: Full-size SUV Sensitivity

Fullsize SUV			
Change in Segment Share	-100bps	-200bps	-300bps
Segment Share	3.2%	2.2%	1.2%
Ford			
Ford Segment Share	18.7%	18.7%	18.7%
Lost Units	(31,752)	(63,504)	(95,256)
Contribution Per Unit	10,000	10,000	10,000
Pre-tax Impact	-318	-635	-953
EPS Impact	\$ (0.15)	\$ (0.30)	\$ (0.44)
Offset by growth in other segments			
Ford Total Share	15.5%	15.5%	15.5%
Change in Units	26,434	52,868	79,301
Contribution Per Unit	6,000	6,000	6,000
Pre-tax Impact	159	317	476
EPS Impact	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.15	\$ 0.22
Ford Pre-Tax Impact	(159)	(318)	(477)
Ford Net EPS Impact	\$ (0.22)	\$ (0.44)	\$ (0.66)
General Motors			
GM Share	59.6%	59.6%	59.6%
Lost Units	(101,344)	(202,688)	(304,031)
Contribution Per Unit	12,000	12,000	12,000
Pre-tax Impact	-1216	-2432	-3648
EPS Impact	\$ (2.14)	\$ (4.27)	\$ (6.41)
Offset by growth in other segments			
GM Share	23.8%	23.8%	23.8%
Units Gained	40,410	80,821	121,231
Contribution Per Unit	6000	6000	6000
Pre-tax Impact	242.46	484.93	727.39
EPS Impact	\$ 0.43	\$ 0.85	\$ 1.28
GM Net Pre-tax Impact	(974)	(1,947)	(2,921)
GM Net EPS Impact	\$ (1.71)	\$ (3.42)	\$ (5.13)

Source: Deutsche Bank, Wards, Company reports

Figure 4: Estimated Variable Margin by Segment

SEGMENT	Example Vehicles	\$ Per Unit
LOWER SMALL CAR	Aveo	1,500
UPPER SMALL CAR	Cobalt	2,500
MIDSIZE CAR	Impala / Malibu	5,000
LARGE CAR	Lucerne / G8	7,500
LOWER LUXURY	CTS	7,500
MIDDLE LUXURY	DTS / STS	13,000
LUXURY SPORT	Corvette	18,000
SMALL CROSSOVER	Equinox	2,500
LARGE CROSSOVER	Enclave / Acadia	9,000
MIDDLE SUV	Trailblazer / Envoy	6,000
LARGE SUV	Tahoe / Yukon	12,000
LARGE LUX SUV	Escalade	18,000
MINIVAN	Uplander	5,000
LARGE VAN	Express / Savana	7,500
SMALL PICKUP	Colorado / Canyon	4,000
LARGE PICKUP	Silverado / Sierra	8,000

Source: Deutsche Bank

Valuation and Risks

In terms of price targets for stocks in our universe, we utilize an EV/EBITDA valuation methodology for our companies with extensive liabilities including high debt levels and large pension and post employment obligations. We utilize the P/E valuation methodology for companies that generate considerable free cash flow and exhibit an ability to consistently grow earnings. The principal sector risks include: 1) significantly higher or lower-than expected North American auto demand – given the high operating leverage in the auto industry, auto company earnings are highly correlated with industry volume; and 2) a significantly improving mix outlook. U.S. automakers are facing a deteriorating mix as a result of several factors, including higher fuel prices.

Appendix 1

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Equity rating key Equity rating dispersion and banking relationships


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